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EVOLUTION AND INNOVATION IN GUARDIANSHIP 
LAWS: ASSISTED DECISION-MAKING 
Shih-Ning Then* 
Guardianship laws in most Western societies provide decision-making mechanisms for adults with 
impaired capacity.  Since their inception, the principle of autonomy and recognition of human rights of 
those that come within guardianship regimes have gained prominence.  Today, in Australia and 
internationally, a new legal model has emerged that seeks to enhance these trends through 
incorporating ‘assisted decision-making’ models into guardianship laws.  Such models legally 
recognise that an adult’s capacity may be maintained through assistance or support provided by 
another person, and provides formal recognition of the person in that ‘assisting’ role.  This paper 
situates this latest legal innovation within a historical context, examining the social and legal 
evolution of guardianship laws and determining whether modern assisted decision-making models 
remain consistent with guardianship reform thus far.  It goes on to identify and critically analyse the 
different assisted decision-making models that currently exist internationally.  Finally it discusses a 
number of conceptual, legal and practical concerns that remain unresolved.  It is argued that these 
issues require serious consideration before assisted decision-making models are adopted in 
guardianship regimes in Australia.  
INTRODUCTION 
The vast majority of Western societies have legal regimes that provide decision-making 
mechanisms for adults with some kind of impaired capacity.1  Such mechanisms may allow 
adults to plan decisions in advance, allow close family to make decisions on behalf of the 
adult, or enable courts to appoint a person as a guardian or administrator for the adult.  
These legal regimes are collectively referred to as ‘guardianship laws’.  Since their humble, 
property-focussed beginnings, guardianship regimes have become an increasingly 
important, and often contentious, area of law where different principles such as beneficence 
and protection, autonomy, and the notion of ‘human rights’ jostle for superiority.   
A number of Western jurisdictions are currently considering, or have recently embraced, 
innovative legislation that allows for another form of decision-making – ‘assisted decision-
making’, also known as supported, interdependent or co-decision-making.2  Assistance or 
support for an adult provided by another person can take many forms including help with 
accessing information, providing information to the adult, or giving explanations in a manner 
the adult can understand.  It also extends to giving advice, communicating the decision 
                                            
* Lecturer, QUT’s Health Law Research Centre, Faculty of Law, Queensland University of Technology.  
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Professor Ben Mathews, Dr Andrew McGee and Andrew Garwood-Gowers for feedback on earlier 
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1 The term ‘adult’ is used in this paper to refer to those who may come within a guardianship regime 
due to some kind of decision-making impairment.  
2 While Australian audiences may be more familiar with the terminology ‘supported decision-making’, 
as this is associated with particular legislative models the terminology adopted in this paper is for 
assisted decision-making to represent the broad concept, which includes ‘supported decision-making’ 
and ‘co-decision-making’ models used in some jurisdiction’s guardianship legislation.  It is noted that 
in the literature, these terms are often used interchangeably.  
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made or acting to help implement the adult’s decisions.3  Modern legislation that recognises 
or implements this concept remains limited to a small but growing number of jurisdictions 
internationally.  It is this legislative recognition in guardianship regimes that is the focus of 
this paper 
Significantly, legal and practical interest in this concept is growing in Australia.  Australia’s 
ratification of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD),4 as well as 
recent Federal initiatives like the National Disability Insurance Scheme which support 
providing more choice to those with disabilities and encourage personal management of 
funding (and which are being mirrored overseas) provide additional support for a new model 
of decision-making.  In 2012, the Victorian Law Reform Commission was the first Australian 
law reform agency to recommend that a legislative scheme of assisted decision-making be 
adopted in Victoria.5  In South Australia and New South Wales, government departments 
and statutory bodies are piloting trials of assisted decision-making for personal and financial 
matters.6  This current impetus domestically for adopting assisted decision-making has not 
yet been analysed in the Australian legal context.  It is important to do so to ensure 
Australian jurisdictions that choose to enact legislation adopting these models into 
guardianship regimes are mindful of the potential issues inherent in such schemes, and are 
aware of the experience of international jurisdictions.  
It should be noted that the notion of assisted decision-making discussed in this paper takes a 
moderate view of the ability and reach of such an approach helping adults; it accepts that 
assisted decision-making is likely to be accessible and useful only to a limited group of 
individuals and not all adults coming within a guardianship regime.  Such an approach would 
                                            
3 Nandini Devi, Jerome Bickenbach and Gerold Stucki, ‘Moving Towards Substituted or Supported 
Decision-making? Article 12 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ (2011) 5 
ALTER, European Journal of Disability Research 249, 254–5.  See also Leslie Salzman, 'Rethinking 
Guardianship (Again): Substituted Decision-making as a Violation of the Integration Mandate of Title II 
of the Americans with Disabilities Act' (2010) 81 University of Colorado Law Review 157, 180. 
4 See, eg, United Nations, Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons, GA Res 3447, 9 December 
1975; United Nations, Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons, GA Res 2856, 20 
December 1971; Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 
2007, 2515 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 May 2008).  Australia ratified the CRPD on 17 July 2008 with 
the declaration that it was Australia’s understanding that the CRPD ‘allows for fully supported or 
substituted decision-making arrangements, which provide for decisions to be made on behalf of a 
person, only where such arrangements are necessary, as a last resort and subject to safeguards’. 
5  Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship Final Report, Report No 24 (2012) ch 8, 9.  
6 Office of the Public Advocate, ‘Developing a Model of Practice for Supported Decision-making’ (June 
2011) <http://www.opa.sa.gov.au/cgi-
bin/wf.pl?pid=&mode=cd&file=../html/documents/09_Publications/Supported%20Decision%20Makin
g>; New South Wales Attorney General and Justice, ‘New South Wales Trustee & Guardian, Annual 
Report 2010-11’ (2011) 37. See also, Michael Bach, ‘Supported Decision-making under Article 12 of 
the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ (Paper presented as Conference on 
Legal Capacity and Supported Decision-making, Parents’ Committee of Inclusion, Athlone, Ireland, 3 
November 2007); Queensland Law Reform Commission, A Review of Queensland's Guardianship Laws, 
Report No 49 (1996) 201-4; Alberta Justice and Alberta Seniors and Community Supports, Legislative 
Review of the Dependent Adults Act and the Personal Directives Act - Final Report and 
Recommentations (2007); Standing Committee on Social Issues, Parliament of New South Wales, 
Substitute Decision-Making for People Lacking Capacity (2010) [5.62]–[5.102] (‘Substitute Decision-
Making Report’). 
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co-exist with, and supplement, the substituted decision-making norm that currently 
operates in Australia.7   
This paper examines this latest legal innovation against the backdrop of the historical 
development of guardianship laws in Western societies.  Part 1 charts the social and legal 
changes which have led to today’s ‘modern’ guardianship regimes.  The purpose of this Part 
is not merely to provide historical description, but to situate the development of modern 
assisted decision-making schemes and to inform subsequent critical analysis of such 
schemes.  It will show that the concept of assisted decision-making and its subsequent legal 
recognition – through ‘supported’ and ‘co-decision-making’ models – is a natural evolution 
of guardianship regimes.  Part 2 adopts an international perspective, identifying and 
examining the different legal models that currently exist in jurisdictions with assisted 
decision-making mechanisms.   Finally, Part 3 investigates some unanswered questions 
about assisted decision-making schemes.  While no particular assisted decision-making 
model is proposed, this Part does identify a number of unresolved conceptual, legal and 
practical issues that need to be considered prior to the adoption of any assisted decision-
making scheme in Australian jurisdictions.    
This paper ultimately cautions against rushing to fully embrace the concept of assisted 
decision-making through legal recognition (at least in all its manifestations) without due 
consideration of the potential problems that could result.  It highlights the need for 
empirical research into the legal operation of assisted decision-making and whether such 
schemes would add any practical benefit to current Australian guardianship regimes.  
PART 1: UNDERSTANDING THE GUARDIANSHIP CONTEXT: FROM PAST TO PRESENT 
Part 1 explains the context in which modern guardianship laws, and new legal guardianship 
reform, must be considered.  Like any laws, modern guardianship laws were not created in a 
vacuum and have evolved from, and are still shaped by, the social circumstances and values 
present in Western societies at a given time.  An understanding of this is necessary 
(particularly for those unfamiliar with guardianship regimes) to provide context to the latest 
call to create statutory assisted decision-making models.  This Part demonstrates that the 
historical and social factors that have led to recognition of individual human rights, and the 
increasing priority given to the principle of autonomy, also support acceptance of assisted 
decision-making today.  
1.1 Societal changes over time 
1.1.1 State powers – control and institutionalisation 
Guardianship laws have been present, in a limited form, since Roman times.8  Historically, 
the primary aim of guardianship laws was the protection of property – that is financial and 
                                            
7 Cf Others have argued more strongly that assisted decision-making could replace, or is inconsistent 
with, substituted decision-making: see the discussion regarding the drafting of the CRPD in Amita 
Dhanda, ‘Legal Capacity in the Disability Rights Convention: Stranglehold of the Past or Lodestar for 
the Future’ (2007) 34 Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce 429, 444–6, 448. However, 
this has less relevance in Australia where express declarations were made on ratification of the CRPD 
that it is Australia’s understanding that the CRPD: above n 4. 
8 See Sarah Burningham, ‘Adult Guardianship and Co-Decision-Making Law’ (2009) 18 Dalhousie 
Journal of Legal Studies 119, 126-7. Until the late twentieth century, the distinction between mental 
health and guardianship laws was rather unclear. For a discussion of the historical development of 
mental health law compared with guardianship laws see Mary Joy Quinn, Guardianship of Adults: 
Achieving Justice, Autonomy, and Safety (Springer Publishing, 2005) 19–20. 
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real property interests of those people with impaired capacity.9  The exercise of the State’s 
inherent parens patriae jurisdiction granted (and still does today) courts the power to make 
orders dealing with the vulnerable – in this case adults with impaired capacity – for their 
perceived protection and benefit. [insert ref to Powel et al The position in England and 
Wales where the parens patriae jurisdiction no longer exists remains an exception.] 
These early forms of guardianship laws were dominated by the view that the monarch or 
State had a role to play in safeguarding those with impaired capacity through protection of 
their property and personal interests.10  However, this was a very limited scheme; those with 
impaired capacity who had neither property nor family to look after them were often 
neglected and isolated.11   
Later, advances in medical thinking led to those with impaired capacity being viewed 
differently; together with the increasing respect and power of the medical profession came 
the opinion that those with disabilities, including persons with impaired capacity, were sick 
and in need of health care.12  The ‘medical model’, which prevailed at this point, 
characterised the disabled as being ‘inherently and inevitably pathological’.13  Mental 
asylums were established in which persons with impaired capacity (often referred to as 
‘lunatics’ or ‘insane’) were housed on a long term basis; this form of institutionalisation 
dominated well into the 20th century.14  
The Law Reform Commission of England and Wales noted in their 1995 report that where 
adults with impaired capacity lived within such ‘highly-regimented institutions, issues about 
                                            
9 See, eg, Gerry W Beyer, 'Enhancing Self-Determination Through Guardian Self-Declaration' (1990) 23 
Indiana Law Review 71, 72–4; Substitute Decision-Making Report, above n 6 [2.5]; Robert M Gordon 
and Simon N Verdun-Jones, Adult Guardianship Law in Canada (Carswell, 1992) 1-18–1-19; Charles P 
Sabatino, 'Competency: Refining Our Legal Fictions' in Michael Smyer, K Warner Shaie and Marshall B 
Kapp (eds), Older Adults' Decision-Making and the Law, Springer Series on Ethics, Law and Aging 
(Springer Publishing, 1996) 1, 5. 
10 Terry Carney and David Tait, The Adult Guardianship Experiment: Tribunals and Popular Justice (The 
Federation Press, 1997) 10; Salzman, above n 3, 164.   
11 Substitute Decision-Making Report, above n above n 6 [2.6].  See also Sabatino, above n 9, 5 where 
it is noted, ‘[w]hen the alleged incompetent did not possess substantial property, guardianship 
proceedings were rare’. 
12 Carney and Tait, above n 10, 11–12, 15; Substitute Decision-Making Report, above n above n 6 
[2.7]; A Frank Johns, 'Guardainship Folly: The Misgovernment of Parens Patriae and the Forecast of its 
Crumbling Linkage to Unprotected Older Americans in the Twenty-First Century - A March of Folly? Or 
Just a Mask of Virtual Reality?' (1997) 27 Stetson Law Review 1, 20–2. 
13 See Theresia Degener, 'International Disability Law - A New Legal Subject on the Rise: The 
Interregional Experts' Meeting in Hong Kong, December 13 - 17, 1999' (1999) 18 Berkeley Journal of 
International Law 180, 121–2; Lawrence A Frolik, 'Plenary Guardianship: An Analysis, a Critique and a 
Proposal for Reform' (1981) 23 Arizona Law Review 599, 611–2; Rosemary Kayess and Phillip French, 
‘Out of Darkness into Light? Introducing the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ 
(2009) 8 Human Rights Law Review 1, 5–6; Luke Clements and Janet Read, 'Introduction: Life, 
Disability and the Pursuit of Human Rights' in Luke Clements and Janet Read (eds), Disabled People 
and the Right to Life: The Protection and Violation of Disabled People's Most Basic Human Rights 
(Routledge, 2008) 1, 2–3. 
14 Terry Carney and Peter Singer, Ethical and Legal Issues in Guardianship Options for Intellectually 
Disadvantaged People (Watson Ferguson and Co, 1986) 6, 46-8; Carney and Tait, above n 10, 11–12; 
Gordon and Verdun-Jones, above n 9, 1-13–1-15; Johns, above n 12, 20–2; Quinn, above n 8, ch 2.  
See also Law Reform Commission, Mental Incapacity, No 231 (1995) [2.32]. 
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decision-making or the need for a substitute decision-maker were not likely to arise’.15  
While this was likely to be true of personal decisions, many of those who were 
institutionalised had a public body, such as the Public Trustee, take control of their 
finances.16  These actions could be viewed as being consistent in principle (although perhaps 
not in practice) with the historical exercise of the parens patriae jurisdiction to ‘control and 
protect’ the incapable adult.17  At this time the notion of individual rights, particularly for 
these adults, was largely a foreign concept. 
1.1.2 De-institutionalisation, community care and recognition of rights 
Following this period of ‘institutionalisation’, philosophical shifts in thinking from the middle 
of the 20th century led to ‘de-institutionalisation’ and movement of those residents into 
community based care.  The drivers for this change came from various sources.  At this time 
the disability rights movement emerged and championed a shift in thinking from the 
‘medical model’ to a ‘social model’ of disability.18  This model was based on the 
understanding that restrictions experienced by those with disabilities were not an ‘inevitable 
consequence’ of having the disability but were often socially or politically constructed and 
could therefore be changed by such means.19 
This recognition that all persons, regardless of disability, had a right to be treated equally as 
individuals precipitated the shift in how persons with decision-making impairments were 
viewed and treated.  Assumptions that they were dependent and reliant on state welfare 
were challenged and they began to be viewed in light of a rights based model as individuals 
with rights.20  The disability rights movement which started at this time has grown alongside 
and into the legal recognition of an entitlement to universal human rights for everyone, 
regardless of impairment (see 1.4.5 below).   
Also at this time, it came to be appreciated that not all ‘mentally disabling conditions’ were 
fixed and unchangeable.  It came to be understood that decision-making capacities could be 
developed, retained or, in some cases, be exercised with assistance.21  Adults moved from 
institutions to community care were recognised as being vulnerable; while some were 
capable of making decisions, many required assistance with making decisions or needed 
                                            
15 Law Reform Commission, above n 14 [2.32]. See also Neil Rees, 'The Fusion Proposal: A Next Step?' 
(Paper presented at the Rethinking Rights-Based Mental Health Laws Workshop, Prato, Italy, 22 May 
2009) 6.  See also Doug Surtees, ‘The Evolution of Co-Decision-Making in Saskatchewan’ (2010) 73 
Saskatchewan Law Review 75, 76.  
16 Carney and Tait, above n 10, 12.  See also Gordon and Verdun-Jones, above n 9, 3-58.  
17 Salzman, above n 3, 167.  
18 This was in part also driven by the civil rights movement, particularly in the United States:  Quinn, 
above n 8, 13–14; Peter David Blanck and Michael Millender, 'Before Disability Civil Rights: Civil War 
Pensions and the Politics of Disability in America' (2000) 52 Alabama Law Review 1, 3; Burningham, 
above n 8, 141. 
19 Clements and Read, above n 13, 3.  See also Anna Lawson, 'The United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities: New Era or False Dawn?' (2007) 34 Syracuse Journal of 
International Law & Commerce 563, 571–4; Kayess and French, above n 13, 4. 
20 Kayess and French, above n 13, 14; Peter David Blanck and Michael Millender, 'Before Disability 
Civil Rights: Civil War Pensions and the Politics of Disability in America' (2000) 52 Alabama Law 
Review 1, 3. 
21 Robin Creyke, 'Who Can Decide? Legal Decision-Making For Others' (No 19, Department of Human 
Services and Health Aged and Community Care Division, September 1995) 38.  
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someone to act on their behalf.22  At this point the seeds of recognition for assisted decision-
making were sown.  
This movement of adults with impaired capacity into the community served, in part, as the 
catalyst for regulatory mechanisms to be put in place for others to legitimately make 
decisions on behalf of those with impaired capacity.  Decisions regarding health care, 
finances or accommodation often needed to be made.  In the absence of legal recognition a 
substitute decision-maker could not be formally recognised and concerns about the liability 
of those who were caring for and treating those with impaired capacity became apparent.23  
Coupled with these factors was the challenge that arose to the traditional paternalistic 
medical model.  Until this point it was accepted, and expected, that patients would defer to 
the medical professions’ expertise.  Regarding those with decision-making impairments, this 
extended to the medical profession having legal power to treat without the need for 
consent.24  However, around this time attitudes gradually changed from one of respected 
paternalism to one recognising patient rights.  The realisation that assessments of capacity 
were being made by medical professionals without specific training, and often using 
different tests also arose.25  This shift in how health care was conceived also contributed to 
the push for modern guardianship laws. 
1.2 Demographic changes over time 
Up until this point many of the drivers for change came from within the disability sector.  
However, with the aging ‘baby boomer’ populations in Western societies – such as Australia, 
the United Kingdom, Canada and particularly the United States – this segment of society also 
demanded to be heard and contributed to reform.26   
The growing number of older citizens pushed for recognition of legal advance planning 
documents – such as enduring powers of attorney and advance directives – to allow them to 
plan ahead to a time when they could no longer make decisions.27  In addition, in some 
countries, the growing mobility of citizens resulted in increasing numbers of families living 
                                            
22 Law Reform Commission, above n 14 [2.32]. 
23 See, eg, Gordon and Verdun-Jones, above n 9, 1-15.  
24 Carney and Tait, above n 10, 15.   
25 Law Reform Commission, above n 14 [2.41]; Heather Wilkinson, 'Empowerment and Decision-
making for People with Dementia: The Use of Legal Interventions in Scotland' (2001) 5(4) Aging & 
Mental Health 322, 324; Carney and Tait, above n 10, 17; Jennifer Moye, 'Guardianship and 
Conservatorship' in Thomas Grisso (ed), Evaluating Competencies: Forensic Assessments and 
Instruments (Kluwer Academic, 2nd ed, 2003) 309, 317–8.  
26 Gordon and Verdun-Jones, above n 9, 1-12–1-13; Law Reform Commission, above n 14 [2.35]; 
George H Zimny and George T Grossberg, 'Guardianship of the Elderly' in George H Zimny and George 
T Grossberg (eds), Guardianship of the Elderly (Springer Publishing, 1998) 3, 4; JK Mason and GT 
Laurie, Mason and McCall Smith's Law and Medical Ethics (Oxford University Press, 8 ed, 2010) 
[12.02] Pam Lambert, Joan McIver Gibson and Paul Nathanson, 'The Values History: An Innovation in 
Surrogate Medical Decision-Making' (1990) 18(3) Law Medicine & Health Care 202, 202. 
27 The initial push for guardianship legislation was galvanised by those advocating on behalf of people 
with intellectual disabilities, therefore legal recognition of advance planning documents were not 
initially a priority given that this group may have never initially had capacity.  However, the growing 
number of older citizens led to advance planning documents being legislatively recognised: WR Atkin, 
'Adult Guardianship Reforms - Reflections on the New Zealand Model' (1997) 20(1) International 
Journal of Law and Psychiatry 77, 79–80.  See also Terry Carney, 'Abuse of Enduring Powers of 
Attorney: Lessons from the Australian Tribunal Experiment' (1999) 18 New Zealand Universities Law 
Review 481, 482.  
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distant to one another decreasing the level of family support available for some older 
citizens.28  
1.3 Inadequacy of existing legal structures 
As these two groups – the disabled and the elderly (and those that advocated for them) – 
pushed for more societal support and recognition, it became apparent that existing legal 
mechanisms for guardianship were inadequate. 
Prior to major reform (that began in some places from the 1970s), archaic legal procedures 
derived from antiquated English law were relied upon for non-financial guardianship 
matters.  The existing legal framework was inadequate in dealing with these issues.  
Procedures were generally costly, cumbersome and were not considered ‘user-friendly’; as 
such they were rarely utilised.29   
The results of court applications were also inflexible.  Generally where a substitute decision-
maker was appointed, they were given plenary – that is complete – power and authority to 
make all decisions on behalf of the person.30  This ‘all or nothing’ approach completely 
deprived the person subject to the proceedings of any autonomy to make their own 
decisions – regardless of their level of incapacity.31  It also came to be recognised that 
placing an adult within the guardianship regime – which, at this time, usually meant 
appointing a plenary substitute decision-maker – could have ‘serious negative 
consequences’.32  Removing the legal right to make one’s own decisions could lead to a 
‘vicious cycle’ of decline.33 
[An] inability to manage one’s affairs diminish[es] the individual’s opportunities to 
test his or her abilities. The “disuse of decision-making powers” may lead to further 
decline in the individual’s capabilities and sense or competence to act in the world, 
leading to further isolation and loss of abilities. 
The lack of an accessible judicial system for guardianship, coupled with the growing need for 
access to such a regime and poor results when access was gained, provided the impetus for 
the creation of a modern system of guardianship. 
The factors discussed above combined to push the agenda for legal reform.  Increased 
recognition of these problems in academia, the media and by politicians led to a wave of 
                                            
28 Pamela B Teaster et al, Public Guardianship: In the Best Interests of Incapacitated People? (Praeger, 
2010) 2. 
29 This involved invoking the superior courts inherent parens patriae jurisdiction to appoint a 
‘committee’ to look after property and person: Carney and Tait, above n 10, 10–11, 13; Gordon and 
Verdun-Jones, above n 9, 1-16–1-18; Terry Carney, 'The Limits and the Social Legacy of Guardianship 
in Australia' (1989) 18 Federal Law Review 231, 235.  
30 Gordon and Verdun-Jones, above n 9, 1-20–1-21. 
31 Marshall B Kapp, 'Legal Basis of Guardianship' in George H Zimny and George T Grossberg (eds), 
Guardianship of the Elderly (Springer Publishing, 1998) 16, 21; Gordon and Verdun-Jones, above n 9, 
1-20–1-21.  
32 Penelope A Hommel, Lu-in Wang and James A Bergman, 'Trends in Guardianship Reform: 
Implications for the Medical and Legal Professions' (1990) 18 Law, Medicine & Health Care 213, 214; 
Jennifer L Wright, 'Guardianship for Your Own Good: Improving the Well-Being of Respondents and 
Wards in the USA' (2010) 33 International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 350. 
33 See Salzman, above n 3, 168-70; A Kanter, ‘The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities and its implications for the rights of elderly people under intentional law’ (2008) 25 
Georgia State University Law Review 527, 561; Dhanda, above n 7, 436–7. 
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legal reform internationally that started in the mid-1970s.34  Subsequent ‘waves’ of reform 
have continued since that time and, arguably, we are riding the current ‘wave’ leading to the 
incorporation legal assisted decision-making mechanisms.  
1.4 Features of modern guardianship laws 
The resulting legal reform led to guardianship regimes in most Western societies, including 
Australia, sharing certain key features.  An examination of these fundamental features 
reveals how assisted decision-making fits well with, or in some cases challenges, the 
traditional features of modern guardianship regimes.   
1.4.1 The role of the law, state and society 
What purpose guardianship laws should serve is closely linked to how society views the roles 
of the public State and the private citizen.  Over time there has been a shift in emphasis 
from the safety and care of those with impaired capacity being the responsibility of the State 
via a welfare system, to private care by families and non-public institutions.  Similarly, the 
purpose of guardianship laws has shifted from having the primary aim of being protective 
and ‘reactive’, to having dual functions of protection and facilitating or empowering those 
with impaired capacity to participate in society (often through ‘proactive’ measures 
implemented prior to the impairment). 
Following de-institutionalisation the role of the State in providing care for those with 
impaired capacity changed considerably.  While previously the State took on the 
responsibility of housing and general welfare of many of those with impaired capacity, more 
responsibility began to be placed with families and community.35 
In modern guardianship regimes, although the State has set up structures that allow people 
to access public bodies to assist with decision-making, these are envisaged as measures of 
last resort.36  Instead, guardianship regimes tend to recognise and legitimise, either 
expressly or impliedly, that the majority of decision-making takes place informally through a 
person’s social support networks, often family.37  The steps taken, or proposed to be taken, 
in the latest wave of reforms therefore seek to formalise these support networks by 
providing mechanisms through which these can be legally recognised. 
The law also provided mechanisms for proactive planning through legally recognised 
advance planning documents allowing those with capacity to appoint others close to them 
to act as decision-makers should they lose capacity.  In a similar vein, new assisted decision-
making agreements may also join the list of instruments that allows for private proactive 
planning by individuals.  Such an approach recognises the importance of preserving close 
relationships between the person and their support networks, but it also satisfies the State’s 
                                            
34  See Johns, above n 12, 1; Gordon and Verdun-Jones, above n 9, 1-9–1-12; Quinn, above n 8, ch 2.  
35  The Minister's Committee Considering Rights and Protective Legislation for Intellectually 
Handicapped Persons, Report of the Minister's Committee on Rights & Protective Legislation for 
Intellectually Handicapped Persons (1982) 48, ‘Minister’s Committee Report’. 
36  Carney and Tait, above n 10, 49. 
37  Ibid 29–30, 54; Marshall B Kapp, 'Legal Interventions for persons with dementia in the USA: ethical 
policy and practical aspects' (2001) 5(4) Aging & Mental Health 312, 313–14. 
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secondary aim of achieving ‘administrative simplicity; efficacy and efficiency in the care of its 
citizens’.38  
Even where the guardianship regime was formally engaged with – via advance planning 
documents or applications to courts for the appointment of substitute decision-makers – the 
preference has been for people to appoint, or have appointed for them, persons in a close 
relationship with them.  Statutory officials will only be appointed as a measure of last 
resort.39  (As shown below at 3.3.4, this trend continues in the context of assisted decision-
making.)  While this reflects the principle of the least restrictive approach, it has caused 
some commentators to question whether distributive justice is being achieved within the 
guardianship system.40  The burden – in terms of financial cost, time, and effort – of caring 
or assisting a person who has impaired capacity usually falls to family and friends. The 
community, in most circumstances, has therefore taken over the responsibility of caring and 
assisting those with impaired capacity – a role previously undertaken solely by the State, at 
the State’s cost.  Essentially, what was once a public duty exercised by the State has, in the 
majority of circumstances, become a private duty subject to State over-sight.41  In the 
absence of such private social supports, an adult is left particularly vulnerable.  The issue of 
who helps those without an existing support network is discussed below at 3.3.4.     
1.4.2 Viewing the individual: autonomy and beneficence 
The shift in responsibility from the ‘public’ (State welfare) to the ‘private’ (community/family 
care) aligns, to an extent, with the view that prizes autonomy over beneficence of the adult.  
Beneficence, in the form of ‘benign paternalism’ was, until the creation of modern 
guardianship laws, the predominant guiding principle in Western societies treatment of 
those with impaired capacity.  Today, the emphasis has shifted from protection of those 
with impaired capacity, to support for and inclusion of those adults in decisions affecting 
them; that is, promotion of their autonomy.42   
Autonomy in this context does not mean simply leaving the adult in question alone to do 
what they want, but includes support for the adult to maximise the options available to him 
                                            
38 Carney and Tait, above n 10, 29–30; Marshall B Kapp, above n 37, 313–4; Jay Chalke, 'Canadian 
Trends: Guardianship in British Columbia and Other Provinces' (Paper presented at the The Law 
Reform Commission Annual Conference, Dublin, Ireland, 2 December 2005) 4.  
39 Frolik, above n 13, 642–3.  This was particularly so in the USA where in the past the option of a 
statutory official of last resort representing the person was frequently not legislatively provided for: 
Pamela B Teaster et al, above n 28, 16–18. 
40 Terry Carney and David Tait, 'Guardianship Dilemmas and Care of the Aged' (1991) 13 Sydney Law 
Review 61.  See also Allen E Buchanan and Dan W Brock, Deciding For Others: The Ethics of Surrogate 
Decision-making (Cambridge University Press, 1989) 207–11. 
41 Carney and Tait, above n 10, 49.  See also Frolik, above n 13 who makes a similar point: 
‘Guardianship came to be seen less as a delegation of state authority and more of an example of the 
state monitoring the activities of private citizens’. States have, however, maintained obligations of 
investigation and protection of vulnerable adults (including those with impaired capacity) from abuse, 
neglect and exploitation.  See generally, Robert M Gordon, ‘Adult Protection Legislation in Canada – 
Models, Issues, and Problems’ (2001) 24 International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 117.  
42 Gordon and Verdun-Jones, above n 9, 1-29.  Cf. the approach in mental health legislation generally 
where paternalism, protection of the patient and protection of others are the key underlying 
principles: Genevra Richardson, 'Balancing Autonomy and Risk: A Failure of Nerve in England and 
Wales?' (2007) 30 International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 71, 71–2; Genevra Richardson, 
'Autonomy, Guardianship and Mental Disorder: One Problem, Two Solutions' (2002) 65 Modern Law 
Review 702, 708. 
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or her.43  The promotion of autonomy was the primary rationale behind guardianship 
regimes statutorily recognising legally binding advance planning documents, and it remains a 
primary driver for enacting assisted decision-making mechanisms.  While courts in most 
Western societies today still exercise their parens patriae power to make decisions on behalf 
of adults with impaired capacity, the application of the best interests test today incorporates 
taking into account the known views and wishes of the adult in question.44  Therefore, 
today, the best interests test does not ignore the need to consider the individual’s wishes; 
however, it remains an essentially paternalistic approach.  
It is arguable that assisted decision-making models promote autonomy by helping to modify 
third party’s interactions with adults, allowing them to participate in society even when their 
decision-making abilities start to diminish.45  As noted by Salzman the notion of assisted 
decision-making,46 
is predicated on the basic principle that all people are autonomous beings who 
develop and maintain capacity as they engage in the process of their own decision-
making, even if some level of support is needed to do so.  In …[an assisted] decision-
making paradigm, the individual receives support from a trusted individual, network 
of individuals, or entity to make personal, financial, and legal decisions that must be 
followed by third parties (such as financial institutions, businesses, health 
professionals, and service providers). 
While in the past informal assisted decision-making may have been successful, arguably 
Western societies today are increasingly risk averse and many professionals and institutions 
are concerned with legal liability.47  As such, where a person has questionable capacity, their 
ability to participate in day to day activities through necessary transactions is likely to be 
increasingly questioned.48 
This is particularly likely in transactions that take place commonly in society, i.e. entering 
into contracts or leases, buying or selling property, dealing with banks, consenting to health 
                                            
43 Wilkinson, above n 25, 323.  In discussing empowerment and capacity Wilkinson notes that 
empowerment can come about from joint or collaborative decision-making, although she notes that, 
‘the complete removal of constraints at the individual level may be more difficult to envisage, even to 
the extent that such a situation may actually disempower the cognitively impaired individual who 
requires some support to make decisions’. See also Kathleen Glass, ‘Refining Definitions and Devising 
Instruments: Two Decades of Assessing Mental Competence’ (1997) 20 International Journal of Law 
and Psychiatry 5, 30. 
44 Ben White, Lindy Willmott and Shih-Ning Then, 'Adults Who Lack Capacity: Substitute Decision-
Making' in Ben White, Fiona McDonald and Lindy Willmott (eds), Health Law in Australia (Thomson 
Reuters, 2010) 149, 157.  
45 Other benefits to formalising an assisted decision-making model may include adhering to non-
maleficent principles;  Glass notes that models of assisted decision-making not only promote 
autonomy, but also protect against ‘the harm of making an ignorant decision without the necessary 
assistance or of not being allowed to make a personal decision at all’: Glass, above n 43, 31. 
46 Salzman, above n 3, 180. 
47 Robert M Gordon, 'The Emergence of Assisted (Supported) Decision-Making in the Canadian Law of 
Adult Guardianship and Substitute Decision-Making' (2000) 23(1) International Journal of Law and 
Psychiatry 61, 64. 
48 See, eg, Lawrence A Frolik, 'Is a Guardian the Alter Ego of the Ward?' (2007) 37 Stetson Law Review 
53, 60–1. 
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care etc.49  Problems with informal supporters attempting to access information on behalf of 
an adult are increasing in a climate of privacy concerns.50  In the absence of some formal 
recognition of those acting to support those with some impaired capacity, it might be argued 
that these adults would be socially and legally excluded from many aspects of normal life.  
Formalising relationships might mean that third parties will have confidence relying upon 
those legally recognised roles.51  In addition such recognition may, in formalising the help of 
family and friends, act as a way for them to be involved without ‘taking over’ and falling into 
informal substitute decision-making. It may also increase the time and quality of support 
received, allowing adults to take more control over their lives.52   
The persisting influence of beneficence in the law today is, however, evidenced by ‘best 
interests’ remaining as a guiding principle for those appointed under assisted decision-
making schemes (see 1.4.4 below).  As discussed in Part 3, a tension therefore continues to 
exist between acting beneficently and promoting autonomy in adults.53  
1.4.3 The concept of incapacity 
Moving from the values underpinning modern guardianship regimes to more concrete legal 
concepts, one key feature of guardianship regimes is reliance on the concept of incapacity.  
Guardianship laws generally operate upon a threshold of a person becoming ‘incapacitated’.  
Today, the traditional view that capacity was an all or nothing assessment has been rejected; 
now it is generally acknowledged that the assessment of capacity for decision-making should 
be decision-specific and time-specific, and assessed based on a ‘functional’ approach.54  In 
theory, modifications in court orders can be made to accommodate these limitations while 
still allowing the maximum extent of autonomy possible.  At least in Australia, the practice of 
tribunals making limited – rather than plenary – guardianship orders where possible is 
                                            
49 For example, the proliferation of legislation which legally recognises certain family members as 
appropriate decision-makers for those with impaired capacity can be seen as a legal response to the 
concerns expressed by the medical profession regarding their legal liability in providing treatment 
without legally valid consent. See, eg, Gordon and Verdun-Jones, above n 9, 6-31; Robert G Jones, 
'The Law and Dementia - Issues in England and Wales' (2001) 5(4) Aging & Mental Health 329, 329; 
Carney and Singer, above n 14, 100–1; Frolik, above n 48, 75–6; White, Willmott and Then, above n 
44, 199–202 [6.370]–[6.400]. 
50 Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship Final Report, Report No 24 (2012) [8.101]. 
51 See, eg, Lana Kerzner, ‘Paving the way to Full Realization of the CRPD’s Rights to Legal Capacity and 
Supported Decision-Making: A Canadian Perspective’ (Paper presented at New Foundations for 
Personhood and Legal Capacity in the 21st Century, Centre for Inclusion and Citizenship at the 
University of British Columbia, April 2011) 35, 40, discussing British Columbia’s assisted decision-
making model.  
52 Office of the Public Advocate South Australia, SA Supported Decision-making Project:  August 2011 
Update (August 2011) Office of the Public Advocate South Australia < http://www.opa.sa.gov.au/cgi-
bin/wf.pl?pid=&hi=&mode=show&folder=../html/documents/09_Publications/Supported%20Decisio
n%20Making&file=3-SDM%20-%20August%202011%20Update.htm>. 
53 See, eg, Carney and Singer, above n 14, 3–6 discussing the competing goals of maximising the 
freedom of the individual and protecting the welfare of the individual.  
54 Surtees, above n 15, 81.  While different methods of assessing capacity (‘status’, ‘outcome’ and 
‘functional’ approaches) have been identified, The functional approach to determining capacity is 
seen as being most respectful to an adults autonomy: White, Willmott and Then, above n 44, 167-
169[6.120]-[6.140]; Cheryl Tilse et al, ‘Managing Older People’s Money: Assisted and Substitute 
Decision-making in Residential Aged-Care’  (2011) 31 Ageing & Society 93, 94–5.  
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generally preferred. This practice is not, however, reflected globally; literature suggests that 
both at a social/health care and judicial level this approach may not be the usual practice.55  
However, the use of incapacity as a threshold concept is being challenged by some assisted 
decision-making mechanisms.56  Indeed, what distinguishes the existing legal mechanisms 
from the proposed assisted decision-making models is that ‘incapacity’ is not the trigger for 
operation of these proposed mechanisms.  In fact, the assumption is that these operate to 
assist in maintaining the adult’s capacity for longer than would otherwise be the case. 
1.4.4 A principle based approach 
Another feature of modern guardianship regimes has been legislation that adopts a principle 
based approach.  Commonly, guardianship legislation expressly states a number of general 
principles that guide how those acting within the guardianship regime should act.57  
Common principles include the presumption of capacity, adopting the least restrictive 
option, a recognised respect for an adult’s autonomy and an adult’s inclusion as a valued 
member of their community.58  Some guardianship regimes maintain the principle that the 
adult’s best interests are a primary consideration for those acting in accordance with the 
legislation.  Although these principles overlap and have been expressed in various ways, they 
remain the core principles on which modern guardianship laws are now shaped.   
These principles, in general, favour the concept of assisted decision-making that seeks to 
maintain an adult’s decision-making capacity for as long as possible.  However, as discussed 
in Part 3, when these principles conflict it presents difficulties for those appointed under 
assisted decision-making models.  
                                            
55  See Glass, above n 43, regarding assessments of capacity. See also Lawrence Frolik, ‘Guardianship 
Reform: When the Best is the Enemy of the Good’ (1998) 9 Stanford Law & Policy Review 347, 354. 
56 In particular the British Columbia representation agreements allow appointment of a person to act 
in the role of a supporter and substitute decision-maker does not use the traditional concept of 
capacity as a threshold concept. Instead, a more ‘flexible’ approach is used to determine whether a 
person can enter into an agreement which includes: communicating the desire to have a 
representative assist in decision-making, demonstrating choice and an ability to express 
approval/disapproval of others, awareness of the role of the representative and the existence of a 
trusting relationship with the representative: Representation Agreement Act, BC 1996, c 405, s 8.  
While this different version of capacity has been welcomed by some, it also creates uncertainty in the 
law: Kerzner, above n 51, 39–40. 
57 In recent times, jurisdictions reforming guardianship laws have looked to align their legislation with 
those principles in the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD): Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 2515 UNTS 3 (entered into 
force 3 May 2008).  Recent examples include the recommendations in the Queensland Law Reform 
Commission, A Review of Queensland's Guardianship Laws, Report No 67 (2010) ch 3; Alberta Justice 
and Alberta Seniors and Community Supports, above n 6, 22.  See also Department for Constitutional 
Affairs, Mental Capacity Act 2005: Code of Practice (The Stationary Office, 2007) ch 2; Gary Scot 
Stevenson, Tracy Ryan and Susan Anderson, 'Principles, Patient Welfare and the Adults With 
Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000' (2009) 32 International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 120, 122.  
58 See, eg, Yokohama declaration art 3(1); Creyke, above n 21, 40–3; Carney and Tait, above n 10, 29; 
Minister’s Committee Report, above n 35, 25–26; Gordon and Verdun-Jones, above n 9, 6-49–6-50; 
Kapp, above n 31; Australian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship and Management of Property, 
Report No 52 (1989) [2.3], [2.6]; Queensland Law Reform Commission, above n 57, vol 1, 40–1; Law 
Reform Commission, above n 14 [3.2].  See also Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 
opened for signature 30 March 2007, 2515 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 May 2008) art 12.  
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1.4.5 A human rights approach  
Finally, the increased prominence of human rights in guardianship laws must be 
acknowledged.  The disability rights movement that started in the 1970s has developed 
alongside, and into, a broader human rights approach that now dominates guardianship law 
reform.59  In some jurisdictions, where human rights charters have been implemented, they 
have provided an additional base from which guardianship laws have naturally evolved.60  
This movement of recognising equal human rights is also reflected at the international level, 
with the CRPD being the most significant international instrument.   
Article 12 of the CRPD provides for equal recognition before the law.  Commentators suggest 
that article 12 marks a ‘paradigm shift’61 from traditional guardianship practices of 
appointing a plenary substitute decision-maker, to promoting autonomy for as long as 
possible.  It relevantly states:62 
12.2. States Parties shall recognize that persons with disabilities enjoy legal 
capacity63 on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life. 
12.3. States Parties shall take appropriate measures to provide access by persons 
with disabilities to the support they may require in exercising their legal capacity. 
While subject to fierce debate, article 12 has proved instrumental in providing an additional 
driver for statutory recognition of assisted decision-making.64  Since the CRPD it has been 
increasingly recognised that difficulty in decision-making or in communicating a decision is 
not the same as an inability.65  Article 12 envisages systems put in place by member states 
that allow an individual’s decision-making to be supported or assisted to preserve their 
autonomy to the maximum extent.66  There has been a call for legal mechanisms that 
                                            
59 See, eg, Anna Lawson, 'The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: 
New Era or False Dawn?' (2007) 34 Syracuse Journal of International Law & Commerce 563.  Note that 
some commentators disagree with the rights based approach of modern guardianship laws: see 
Barbara Carter, 'Adult Guardianship: Human Rights or Social Justice?' (2010) 18 Journal of Law and 
Medicine 143; Alison P Barnes, 'Commentary: The More Things Change: Principles and Practices of 
Reformed Guardianship' in Michael Smyer, K Warner Schaie and Marshall B Kapp (eds), Older Adults' 
Decision-Making and the Law, Springer Series on Ethics, Law, and Aging (Springer Publishing, 1996) 
254.  
60 See, eg, Gordon and Verdun-Jones, above n 9, 1-16, 6-3–6-29. 
61 See, eg, A Kanter, above n 33, 560.  This terminology has also been associated with the CRPD 
generally, see Kayess and French, above n 13, 3. 
62 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 2515 
UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 May 2008). 
63 See Kerzner, above n 51, 13-15 for a discussion of the term ‘legal capacity’.  
64 See generally Dhanda, above n 7; UN, OHCHR, IPU, ‘From Exclusion to Equality Realizing the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities: Handbook for Parliamentarians on the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol’ (No. 17, UN, OHCHR, IPU, 2007) 89–91;  Victorian 
Law Reform Commission, above n 5, [8.1], [8.10]–[8.12].  
65 Rosemary Kayess and Ben Fogarty, ‘The Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities – A United 
Nations Convention’ (2007) 32 Alternative Law Journal 22, 25.  
66 See also Janet Lord, David Suozzi and Allyn Taylor, ‘Lessons from Experience of U.N. Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Addressing the Democratic Deficit in Global Health 
Governance’ (2010) Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 564, 573 who state: ‘Article 12 essentially 
creates a continuum of support, thereby acknowledging that some disabled people require no 
support in making decisions, while others may need intensive support.’ 
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provide a ‘sliding scale’ of decision-making options for those who have trouble making 
decisions alone.67  Indeed, Kerzner has argued that under articles 12 and 5, governments and 
third parties have obligations to take ‘positive’ steps to facilitate the use of supports.68  
Legally recognised assisted decision-making models therefore help society to transition from 
a view of adults either ‘possessing capacity or not’ and instead allowing legal systems to 
‘embrace a view of individuals as possessing a variety of faculties and abilities’.69   
Part 1 has demonstrated that the theory of assisted decision-making is consistent with many 
of the key features of modern guardianship regimes and with the overall trajectory of 
guardianship law reform to date.  The attention that is being directed towards assisted 
decision-making globally, and within Australia, is therefore not surprising; it is unlikely that 
assisted decision-making will be abandoned now that interest has been stoked.  As such, 
there is a need for critical legal analysis of how this might be implemented. 
Part 2 examines how the theory of assisted decision-making has been incorporated into 
statutory regimes in overseas jurisdictions.  As shown below, a number of different models 
have been adopted which embrace, to varying extents, the assisted decision-making 
approach.  Part 3 goes on to critically examine the potential problems that arise from these 
legal approaches. 
PART 2: FROM THEORY TO LEGAL REALITY: ASSISTED DECISION-MAKING IN GUARDIANSHIP LAWS 
2.1 Different approaches to decision-making 
Four different types of decision-making approaches have been identified that broadly 
correlate with what has been legally recognised in some guardianship regimes:70 
1. Supportive decision-making: this presumes that the adult has the ability to make 
decisions but requires help in executing decisions. 
2. Shared decision-making: involves shared decisional responsibility between the adult 
and another person. 
3. Delegated decision-making: relies on delegation through advance planning tools 
such as enduring powers of attorney and advance health directives to ensure that 
the adult’s preferences are known if the adult loses capacity.  
4. Surrogate decision-making: occurs where the State vests another person with 
substitute decision-making authority for the adult.71 
The third and fourth type of decision-making are already present in most modern 
guardianship regimes: these approaches mirror the ability to execute advance planning tools 
and the substituted decision-making norm where an appointed guardian or administrator 
makes decisions on behalf of the adult.  These two approaches are standard in guardianship 
regimes and will not be discussed further. 
                                            
67 Kayess and Fogarty, above n 65, 25. See also Lord, above n 66, 573 who also talk about a 
‘continuum’ of decision-making. See also Office of the Public Advocate, above n 5, 11–13. 
68 Kerzner, above n 51, 62–3. 
69 Surtees, above n 15, 82–3 
70 Cf Others have included more categories of decision-making models, see, eg, Barbara Carter, 
‘Supported Decision-making: Background and Discussion paper’ (Office of the Public Advocate of 
Victoria, November 2009) 18–19; Bach, above n 6, 4–8.  
71 Kathleen Wilber and Sandra Reynolds, ‘Rethinking Alternatives to Guardianship’ (1995) 35 The 
Gerontologist 248, 249–50.  The descriptions of the 4 categories are modified from this paper.  
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The first and second type of decision – supportive and shared decision-making – are less 
common in legislation but are garnering increasing interest since the adoption of the CRPD.  
These two types of decision-making both broadly fit within the concept of assisted decision-
making.  As noted by Surtees, legal recognition of these different forms of decision-making 
would allow societies to: 
continue the movement that began with the move away from plenary guardianship 
... toward limited or tailored guardianship. The next stage in this movement is away 
from limited guardianship, and where appropriate, toward supported decision-
making.72  
While consistent with the aims of CRPD and with the evolution of guardianship laws in 
general, questions remain about how best to incorporate these concepts into modern laws.  
A legal mechanism for assisted decision-making would add to existing mechanisms (i.e. 
enduring powers of attorney and advance health directives) to be used to allow adults to 
plan ahead and potentially gives courts more flexible options for adults.  It fills a legal ‘gap’ 
by formally recognising the need for assistance in the grey area when an adult is between 
having capacity and being considered incapacitated.  It also gives increased legal recognition 
to what is accepted in practice: that there is a sliding scale of decision-making capabilities, 
and not being at the top of the scale does not mean your legal right to make decisions 
should be denied.  
2.2 Current models of assisted decision-making 
Currently three major models exist in guardianship legislation which recognise the concept 
of assisted decision-making.73  These range from implicitly recognising the existence of the 
practice, through to the extremely novel idea of court imposed co-decision-makers 
appointed for an adult.  It should be emphasised that all of these assisted decision-making 
models operate when an adult is assumed still capable of making some decisions, albeit with 
varying levels of support.  This fundamentally differs from normal substituted decision-
making or advance planning documents which only operate when an adult loses decision-
making capacity.  
2.2.1 Recognition of assisted decision-making in practice 
The first category includes those jurisdictions that recognise the informal practice of assisted 
decision-making but do no more.  The concept of assisted decision-making is by no means 
foreign to modern guardianship regimes; a number of modern guardianship schemes 
impliedly support the notion through adoption of the principles of the ‘least restrictive 
approach’, ‘respect for autonomy’ and ‘presumption of capacity’ (see 1.4.4 above).  While 
not incorporating a full scheme of assisted decision-making, jurisdictions like that in England 
and Wales implicitly support the notion through one of the legislation’s general principles:74 
                                            
72 Surtees, above n 15, 82–3. 
73 Legal recognition and implementation of assisted decision-making comes in many forms.  For the 
purposes of discussion, the different legal mechanisms have been divided into three categories. 
However, it is noted that in some jurisdictions these mechanisms overlap: see 2.2.2 below. 
74 Mental Capacity Act 2005 (Eng & Wales) s 1(3). Also included within the provision on best interests 
is a requirement for a person acting on behalf of a person with questionable capacity to, ‘so far as 
reasonably practicable, permit and encourage the person to participate, or to improve his ability to 
participate, as fully as possible in any act done for him and any decision affecting him: s 4(4).  See also 
Department for Constitutional Affairs, Mental Capacity Act 2005: Code of Practice (The Stationary 
Office, 2007) 20–2, ch 3.  
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A person is not to be treated as unable to make a decision unless all practicable 
steps to help him to do so have been taken without success.  
While provisions such as these recognise and seemingly endorse the practice of assisted 
decision-making, these jurisdictions have not gone beyond merely recognising the informal 
nature of this support.  The real innovation has come about in those jurisdictions that have 
created new legal mechanisms to statutorily recognise and empower those that previously 
acted informally in assisting an adult.  These legal models are discussed in what follows. 
2.2.2 Legally recognised ‘supported’ decision-making models 
Some models – often referred to as ‘supported’ decision-making models – are designed for 
adults who have capacity to make their own decisions but would like someone, or a number 
of persons they trust, to help them in the decision-making process.  This corresponds to the 
‘supportive decision-making’ category.  Today, express inclusion of statutorily recognised 
schemes – that recognise persons who act as ‘assistants’, ‘associates’ or ‘supporters’ – is 
becoming more pronounced.  
Modern assisted decision-making schemes have drawn inspiration from a variety of sources.  
Scandinavian countries led the way in the 1990s introducing the concept of a legally 
recognised ‘support person’, whereas in Canada, the concept can be traced back to the Civil 
Code from the late 1800s.75  Today it is incorporated as a key part of legislative schemes, 
particularly in Canadian jurisdictions, but aspects of it are also present in jurisdictions as 
diverse as Germany and Japan.76  Hybrid schemes also exist in British Columbia where adults 
can enter into ‘Representation Agreements’ – a combination of a supported decision-making 
agreement and an enduring power of attorney – which provide the ‘supporter’ with a wide 
mandate to assist in decision-making through to making decisions on the adult’s behalf.77 
The most recent incarnation of statutorily recognised supported decision-making is from 
Alberta which provides for three levels of decision-making for personal decisions,78 the first 
of which is ‘supported decision-making’.  A similar regime also exists in Yukon.  
Key features of supported decision-making  
                                            
75 Kees Blankman, 'Guardianship Models in the Netherlands and Western Europe' (1997) 20 
International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 47, 55; Gordon, above n 47, 63; Salzman, above n 3, 235-
7; S Danielsen, 'Guardianship, the Danish Approach' in K Blankman (ed), International IGN Conference 
on Guardianship - Conference Book (2008) 79–80; Devi, Bickenbach and Stucki, above n 3, 255–6; 
Gordon, above n 47, 63. See also similar unsuccessful attempts in California to institute a similar 
regime in the 1960s: Robert J Hodgson, 'Guardianship of Mentally Retarded Persons: Three 
Approaches to a Long Neglected Problem' (1973) 37(3) Albany Law Review 407, 413–15. 
76 See generally, Kerzner, above n 51, 28–59, Makoto Arai, ‘Japan’s New Safety Net: Reform of 
Statutory Guardianships and the Creation of Voluntary Guardianships (2000) 13 National Association 
of Elder Law Attorneys Quarterly 1; Israel Doron, ‘Elder Guardianship Kaleidoscope – A Comporative 
Perspective’ (2002) 16 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 368, 373–9. 
77 See generally Representation Agreement Act, BC 1996, c 405. However, there is also the possibility 
of combined agreements like this leading to confusion regarding the role of the person appointed, 
therefore such some prefer the ‘purer’ supported decision-making models contained in Yukon and 
Alberta discussed in this paper: Kerzner, above n 51, 56. 
78 Alberta Justice and Alberta Seniors and Community Supports, above n 6, 29-31. The Victorian Law 
Reform Commission has recently recommended a similar 3 tiered model in its review of guardianship 
legislation: Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 5. 
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While the legislation in Alberta and Yukon is not identical, a number of features can be 
identified that distinguish supported decision-making models from other assisted decision-
making models. 
Private adult controlled agreement: Under these regimes, an adult who ‘understands the 
nature and effect’ of the agreement person can appoint a person of their choice to act as a 
supporter.79  The agreements can be tailored by the adult to include certain roles or cover 
certain types of decisions.80  In Alberta, the legislation provides that the adult is able to 
terminate the agreement (using a prescribed form) at any time.81   
Decision remains the adult’s: Decisions made under these agreements are recognised as 
being the adult’s decision, not the supporter’s.82   
No mandatory involvement by supporter: Generally a supporter need not have offered 
support for an adult’s decision to be valid. In keeping with its focus on autonomy, there 
would seem to be no requirement for an adult to consult with their supporter.  However, 
the Yukon legislation takes a slightly different approach; while it does not mandate that an 
adult consult with a supporter it does allow an application be made to the Court (by the 
adult or supporter) to declare an agreement between the adult and a third party void if the 
agreement is ‘within the responsibilities’ of the supporter, and the adult entered into the 
agreement without consulting their supporter.83  Here, a clear tension exists between 
protecting the adult and allowing that adult to make ‘bad’ decisions.84  This is particularly so 
because decision-making capacity is explicitly preserved by these agreements.  
Supporter has rights of access: The supporter has the legal authority to access, collect or 
obtain information that is relevant to a decision and to assist the person in decision-making 
and, if necessary, communicating his or her decision.85   
Supporter has duties: The supporter has obligations to act in accordance with the general 
principles of the legislation and may have specific requirements to act diligently, honestly 
and in good faith in the ‘best interests’ of the adult.86  In Yukon, in order to avoid liability 
                                            
79 Adult Guardianship and Trusteeship Act, A 2008, c A-4.2, s 4(1); Decision-making, Support and 
Protection to Adults Act, Y 2003, c 21, s 6. Cf A more flexible notion of capacity exists in British 
Columbia: Representation Agreement Act, BC 1996, c 405, s 8.  See also Kerzner, above n 51, 38-9. 
80 Adult Guardianship and Trusteeship Act, A 2008, c A-4.2,  s 4(2); Decision-making, Support and 
Protection to Adults Act, Y 2003, c 21, s 9. Ideally the person appointed should be a trusted individual 
who is familiar with the adult and their communication needs and who is able to offer the support 
required: Bach, above n 6,  9.   
81 Adult Guardianship and Trusteeship Act, A 2008, c A-4.2, s 7. 
82 Adult Guardianship and Trusteeship Act, A 2008, c A-4.2,  s 6(1); Decision-making, Support and 
Protection to Adults Act, Y 2003, c 21, s 11. 
83 Ibid s 12.  
84 See discussion at 3.1.2 below.   
85 Adult Guardianship and Trusteeship Act A 2008, c A-4.2, s 9; Decision-making, Support and 
Protection to Adults Act, Y 2003, c 21,s 10.  In Yukon the obligation extends to endeavouring to ensure 
the adult’s decision is implemented: s 5(1)(e).  
86 Decision-making, Support and Protection to Adults Act, Y 2003, c 21, s 13(1) (these obligations are 
stated in the context of the liability of the supporter).  See also Adult Guardianship and Trusteeship 
(Ministerial) Regulation, Alta Reg 224/2009, s 4(1). 
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supporters must also exercise ‘care… and skill of a reasonably prudent person’.87  In Alberta 
there are also specific records which must be maintained by the supporter.88  
Liability of supporter generally excluded: Where a supporter acts in good faith and in 
accordance with the duties imposed by the legislation, liability for things done while acting 
in that role is generally excluded.89 
Supported decision-making models with these features, generally fit quite well within the 
existing guardianship decision-making paradigm.  The notion of support to assist individuals 
making decisions is already implicitly included in many guardianship laws and taking this 
further step of legally recognising the role formalises this more explicitly.  
2.2.3 Legally recognised co-decision-making 
The most innovative legal model of assisted decision-making is the concept of co-decision-
making which corresponds to the ‘shared decision-making’ model.  Legal models exists in a 
handful of jurisdictions such as the Canadian jurisdictions of Saskatchewan, Quebec90 and 
Alberta which have standalone co-decision-making provisions, to hybrid models in Japan, 
Norway and Denmark.91  The Victorian Law Reform Commission has recently recommended 
that a co-decision-making model (together with supported decision-making) be introduced 
in Victoria.92 
This model creates a new legal concept whereby joint decision-making between the adult 
and the appointed co-decision-maker is mandated.  The actual decision-making process is 
therefore no longer a solo enterprise.  This is a significant departure from the norm which 
recognises the individual adult being the decision-maker (albeit with assistance offered to 
get to that point) or a substitute decision-maker who makes a decision on behalf of an 
incapacitated adult.   
The presumption appears to be that once put in place the adult only has decision-making 
capacity when the co-decision-maker assists the adult; the corollary being that the adult 
lacks decision-making capacity if they act alone.  This requirement obviously limits the 
autonomy of the adult, but to a much lesser extent than if even a partial guardian or 
administrator was appointed.  In some ways, co-decision-making orders recognise that 
decision-making capacity is contingent, in this case on the involvement of another person.   
Key features of co-decision-making 
The Canadian jurisdictions of Saskatchewan and Alberta provide for the most ‘fully-fledged’ 
co-decision-making schemes.  In Saskatchewan, co-decision-making exists instead of a 
supported decision-making model, whereas in Alberta co-decision-making orders are 
                                            
87 Decision-making, Support and Protection to Adults Act, Y 2003, c 21,s 13(1)(b).  
88 Adult Guardianship and Trusteeship (Ministerial) Regulation, Alta Reg 224/2009, s 4.  
89 Decision-making, Support and Protection to Adults Act, Y 2003, c 21, s 13(1); Adult Guardianship and 
Trusteeship Act, A 2008, c A-4.2,  s 10. 
90 The Quebec model share features from both supported and co-decision-making models and the 
legislation is relatively brief. However, as it is a court appointed support position, it has more in 
common with co-decision-making models discussed here. See Civil Code of Quebec, Q 1991, c 64, a 
291-4.  
91 In Japan a hybrid supported/co decision-making model exists, see Arai, above n 76; Doron, above n 
76, 373–7. For a discussion of the Scandanavian approach, see generally, Danielsen, above n 75. 
92 Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 5, ch 8, 9.  
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available alongside supported decision-making agreements.  A closer examination of the key 
features of this model is warranted. 
Court appointed arrangement with adult’s consent: Co-decision-making schemes are 
generally court ordered with no option for an adult to personally appoint a co-decision-
maker.93  However, in Alberta it requires the consent of the adult and the adult can also end 
the agreement.94   
The role of a co-decision-maker is to assist, discuss or ‘advise’ the adult in relevant decisions, 
and the co-decision-maker is able to do all things necessary to give effect to the decision.95  
Generally, in making an appointment the court must consider: 96  
• it to be in the best interests of the adult;97 
• that no less restrictive options are available; 
• that the adult’s capacity is impaired, but the adult can make decisions if given the 
support of a co-decision-maker; and 
• there is a need for such an appointment.  
It can be imagined that courts will face a difficult task in assessing whether the adult has the 
appropriate level of capacity for such an order to be appropriate.98  Reliance on medical 
assessments regarding the level of an adult’s capacity seem likely to become increasingly 
important. 
Courts in both jurisdictions can appoint more than one co-decision-maker and limit the 
order to specific matters.99  The court can require the order to be reviewed after a period of 
time.100 
Regarding the appropriateness of the person appointed as a co-decision-maker, both Alberta 
and Saskatchewan require the court to consider the potential co-decision-maker’s ability to 
carry out their role and duties under the legislation and must take into account their existing 
                                            
93 See, eg, Adult Guardianship and Trusteeship Act, A 2008, c A-4.2, s 13; The Adult Guardianship and 
Co-decision-making Act, S 2000, c A-5.3, s 14(1)(a); Civil Code of Quebec, Q 1991, c 64, 291.  This 
aspect of the scheme has been criticised Kerzner, above n 51, 60. See also Victorian Law Reform 
Commission, above n 5, [9.51]–[9.57]. 
94 Adult Guardianship and Trusteeship Act, A 2008, c A-4.2, ss 13(4)(c), 17(8).  
95 Ibid s 18(2); The Adult Guardianship and Co-decision-making Act, S 2000, c A-5.3, ss 17(1), 42(1). 
96 The Adult Guardianship and Co-decision-making Act, S 2000, c A-5.3, ss 14, 40; Adult Guardianship 
and Trusteeship Act, A 2008, c A-4.2, s 13(4)(a).   
97 In considering the adult’s best interests the court is required to consider the factors in Adult 
Guardianship and Trusteeship Act, A 2008, c A-4.2, s 13(5). 
98 See John Chesterman, ‘Supported Decision-making: Options for Legislative Recognition’ (Office of 
the Public Advocate of Victoria, January 2012) 11.  The Victorian Office of the Public Advocate (at 12) 
suggests as an alternative standard that a co-decision-making order could be made, ‘where the 
person meets the guardianship criteria but where the tribunal believes that the person has sufficient 
capabilities to be able to contribute to the particular decisions that need to be made’. 
99 The Adult Guardianship and Co-decision-making Act, S 2000, c A-5.3, ss 14(2)(b), 40(2)(b); Adult 
Guardianship and Trusteeship Act, A 2008, c A-4.2,  ss 16, 17(1)(-(2).  See also Surtees, above n 15, 90-
1. Note that the Victorian Law Reform Commission has suggested that only 1 co-decision-maker be 
able to be appointed under its suggested legislative scheme: Victorian Law Reform Commission, 
above n 5, [9.67] 
100 The Adult Guardianship and Co-decision-making Act, S 2000, c A-5.3, ss 14(3)(a), 22(1)(b), 40(3)(a), 
47(1)(b); Adult Guardianship and Trusteeship Act, A 2008, c A-4.2, 17(7). 
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relationship with the adult.101  The Court in Alberta must also consider if any potential 
conflict of interest creates a substantial risk that the co-decision-maker would not act in the 
adult’s best interests.102 
Decision-making recognised as shared, but decision deemed the adult’s: The legislation in 
Saskatchewan deems the decision made with the co-decision-maker to have been taken by 
the adult.103  The Alberta legislation remains silent on this point.  
Mandatory involvement by co-decision-maker in some circumstances: As noted above, the 
presumption in co-decision-making models is that the adult only has decision-making 
capacity for specified decisions when the co-decision-maker is involved.  Specific provisions 
in the legislation also give this legal force, albeit limited to some circumstances.104  
(However, it is worth noting that the Victorian Law Reform Commission has recommended 
this be expressly included in the Victorian legislation).105   
In Saskatchewan, for the adult to enter into a signed contract, the document is considered 
voidable unless signed by both the adult and the co-decision-maker.106  However, the co-
decision-maker must not refuse to sign such a document if a ‘reasonable person could have 
made the decision in question and no harm to the adult is likely to result for the decision’.107  
Unlike the Saskatchewan legislation, the legislation in Alberta only has this effect if the Court 
has specified in the order that a contract is voidable if not signed by both parties.108  Where 
the order does specify it, the same limitation on the co-decision-maker applies (i.e. he/she 
cannot refuse if a reasonable person could have made the decision).109  As discussed below, 
this requirement seems at odds with the purported goal of promoting an adult’s decision-
making autonomy; the requirement for ‘reasonableness’ clearly places a restriction on the 
exercise of autonomy and seems to remove the adult’s right to make ‘bad decisions’.  
The mandatory involvement of the co-decision-maker means that the relationship between 
the adult and the co-decision-maker is particularly important.  However, like any 
relationships, these may deteriorate or break down.110  Dispute resolution mechanisms are 
limited to applying to the court to review orders and, in Alberta, the adult is able to 
terminate the co-decision-making arrangement.111   
                                            
101 The Adult Guardianship and Co-decision-making Act, S 2000, c A-5.3, ss 13(1)(e), 14(3)(b), 39(1)(f), 
40(3)(b); Adult Guardianship and Trusteeship Act, A 2008, c A-4.2, 14(1). 
102 Adult Guardianship and Trusteeship Act, A 2008, c A-4.2, s 14(2).  
103 The Adult Guardianship and Co-decision-making Act, S 2000, c A-5.3, ss 23(1), 48(1) states: ‘Any 
decision made, action taken, consent given or thing done by a [personal/property] co-decision-maker 
in good faith respecting any matter within his or her shared authority with the adult is deemed for all 
purposes to have been made, taken, given or done by the adult’. This approach has been adopted by 
the Victorian Law Reform Commission: see Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 5, [9.83]–
[9.85].  
104 See also Civil Code of Quebec, Q 1991, c 64, a 292. 
105 Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 5, [9.86], 165. 
106 The Adult Guardianship and Co-decision-making Act, S 2000, c A-5.3, ss 16, 41. 
107 Ibid ss 17(2), 42(2). 
108 Adult Guardianship and Trusteeship Act, A 2008, c A-4.2, 17(5).  See also Civil Code of Quebec, Q 
1991, c 64, a 294.   
109 Adult Guardianship and Trusteeship Act, A 2008, c A-4.2, 18(5). 
110 Bach, above n 6, 9.  
111 Adult Guardianship and Trusteeship Act, A 2008, c A-4.2, ss 13(4)(c), 17(8). The Victorian Law 
Reform Commission has also recommended a mechanism for dispute resolution in circumstances of 
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Co-decision-maker has rights of access:  Co-decision-makers have similar rights of access to 
information regarding the adult as supporters.112 
Co-decision-maker has duties: The duties of a co-decision-maker in Saskatchewan are the 
same as that of an appointed guardian to:113 
(a) Ensure that the adult’s civil and human rights are protected 
(b) Encourage the adult to  
(i) Participate to the maximum extent in all decisions affecting the adult: and 
(ii) act independently in all matters in which the adult is able to; and 
(c) limit the [co-decision-maker’s] interference in the life of the adult to the greatest 
extent possible.  
In Alberta, once a co-decision-maker is appointed their role extends to acting diligently, in 
good faith and in the adult’s best interests.114  
In Saskatchewan and Alberta a number of general principles of the legislation are applicable 
to co-decision-makers as well.115  As discussed below, this leads to an appreciable tension in 
guiding co-decision-makers between acting paternalistically or in a way that promotes the 
adult’s autonomy.116  
Liability of co-decision-maker generally excluded: Similar to supported decision-making 
models, the existing legislation generally excludes liability for a co-decision-maker acting in 
accordance with the legislation.117  
The novelty and relatively recent introduction of co-decision-making models means we 
know little about how they operate in practice.   
2.3 Legal models of assisted decision-making 
This Part has outlined the three main approaches to assisted decision-making that currently 
exist in guardianship regimes.  As already noted, in Australia, the Victorian Law Reform 
Commission has recommended that the Victorian Government adopt models of supported 
and co-decision-making based on the Alberta models described above.  However, before 
embracing these models in Australia, it would be wise to consider what issues remain 
unanswered in these legislative models.  Part 3 considers these unresolved issues. 
PART 3: UNRESOLVED ISSUES IN ASSISTED DECISION-MAKING MODELS 
Despite the theoretical attractiveness of having supported and co-decision-making 
mechanisms, a number of unresolved issues deserve attention.  While supported decision-
making models present challenges, the potential problems are amplified when considering a 
co-decision-making model.  The novelty of the concept together with difficult questions 
regarding the power differential between the adult and his or her co-decision-maker mean 
serious consideration must be given to the potential issues that may arise. 
                                                                                                                             
irreconcilable disagreement, allowing  either party to be able to apply to VCAT for review of the order: 
Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 5, [9.91]–[9.92], 166-7.  
112 See, eg, Adult Guardianship and Trusteeship Act, A 2008, c A-4., s 22. 
113 The Adult Guardianship and Co-decision-making Act, S 2000, c A-5.3, ss 25, 50. 
114 Adult Guardianship and Trusteeship Act, A 2008, c A-4.2, s 18(1).  
115 Ibid s 2; The Adult Guardianship and Co-decision-making Act, S 2000, c A-5.3, s 3. 
116 See discussion at 3.1.2 below 
117 Adult Guardianship and Trusteeship Act, A 2008, c A-4.2, s 23; The Adult Guardianship and Co-
decision-making Act, S 2000, c A-5.3, s 70. 
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Unfortunately, lack of empirical research about how the existing schemes operate in 
practice, mean we do not yet know if the existing models are free from problems.  In 
Australia, where limited guardianship orders are generally preferred, it might also be 
questioned whether assisted decision-making models would make any practical difference 
to how those with some impaired capacity make decisions.  As such, jurisdictions within 
Australia wishing to implement such schemes should consider the following issues in the 
context of their own social and legal environment before rushing to embrace the latest 
guardianship law innovation.  
3.1 Conceptual Issues 
3.1.1 Lack of conceptual clarity 
The foregoing discussion has demonstrated that supported and co-decision-making models 
are conceptually (and legally) distinct decision-making paradigms.  The literature on this 
topic has, thus far, tended not to distinguish between these two models in discussing 
assisted decision-making and rather adopted a broad brush approach.  However, given the 
distinct features of these models, this seems inappropriate and leads to a lack of conceptual 
clarity and understanding about what assisted decision-making entails.  
3.1.2 Autonomy vs Paternalism 
Two major unresolved issues within existing assisted decision-making models relate to the 
underlying principles and purpose of assisted decision-making models.  The first concerns 
the inconsistent principles within the current legislation that place those acting as 
supporters or co-decision-makers in an untenable situation.  The second relates to whether 
the purpose of assisted decision-making models is truly the promotion of ‘full’ autonomy, or 
some lesser form of autonomy modified by paternalistic notions. 
Inconsistent principles 
A significant question for assisted decision-making models is what guiding principles will be 
used to guide those appointed – beneficence or respect for the adult’s autonomy?  As 
discussed above, while the driver for these models is to preserve the adult’s decision-making 
autonomy and to offer a less restrictive alternative to appointing a substitute decision-
maker, some of the existing provisions only do this to the extent that the adult continues to 
make ‘reasonable’ decisions.118  This is at odds with the recognition that those with some 
level of decision-making impairment have as much right to make ‘bad’ decisions as others.  
This has been described as the ‘dignity of risk’ and reflects a shift from the paternalistic 
attitude of protecting an individual from their own ‘unwise choices’ to respecting the 
autonomy of the individual and their right to choose.119  These provisions may prevent an 
                                            
118 See discussion at 2.2.3 above.  
119 Hommel, Wang and Bergman, above n 32, 222.  See also Robert Perske, 'The Dignity of Risk' in 
Wolf Wolfensberger (ed), The Principle of Normalization in Human Services (National Institute of 
Mental Retardation, 1972) 194. See also Substitute Decision-Making Report, above above n 6 [5.87], 
[5.94], [5.101]; Carter, above n 70, 21. It is explicitly included within modern definitions of capacity 
that just because a person makes a decision that is unreasonable, eccentric or considered to be a ‘bad 
decision’, this does not automatically mean that the person lacks capacity: Guardianship and 
Management of Property Act 1991 (ACT) s 6A; Protection of Personal and Property Rights Act 1988 
(NZ) ss 6(3), 25(3) (discussed in Canadian Centre for Elder Law Studies and British Columbia Law 
Institute, 'A Comparative Analysis of Adult Guardianship Laws in BC, New Zealand and Ontario' (CCELS 
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adult with the financial means from entering into a particularly risky but high gain 
investment (and as such might be considered equivalent to high stakes gambling), if the co-
decision-maker thinks that no reasonable person would enter into such an agreement and 
that major financial harm could result to the adult.  No such limitation, of course, applies to 
those deemed fully competent.  In this context, the limitation imposed by the need for 
‘reasonable’ decisions would seem particularly incongruous as in an assisted decision-
making paradigm there is no finding of actual incapacity.120   
In addition, the legislation in some jurisdictions continues to state that the best interests of 
the adult are the predominant guiding principle.121  Where no further guidance is given as to 
how to interpret this phrase, the test is essentially a paternalistic welfare test.122  The 
appropriateness of this as a guiding principle in the context of assisted decision-making is 
questionable.123  While the best interests test as applied by the courts includes consideration 
of an adult’s views expressed views, decisions by the adult which appear unwise, unhealthy, 
unreasonable or involve any risk of harm may be difficult for a supporter or co-decision-
maker to agree to if one of their duties under the legislation requires them to place the best 
interests of the adult as the primary consideration.  This puts those individuals in an 
unfortunate and conflicted position.  These concerns are amplified in co-decision-making 
models due to the increased and mandatory involvement of the co-decision-maker.  While 
this may be a way to ensure that co-decision-makers do not go to the other extreme and fail 
to act for fear that to ‘interfere’ would be against the principles of assisted decision-making, 
it seems incongruous with the overall intention of such schemes.124  This inconsistency in 
principles needs to be addressed by governments seeking to implement such reforms.  It is 
noted that the recommendations of the Victorian Law Reform Commission attempt to 
address issue this through adopting new general principles.125 
Promoting ‘full’ autonomy? 
A second and related issue is what the legislation is attempting to achieve.  In Part 1, 
autonomy was recognised as a key principle driving interest in assisted decision-making 
models.  While the assumption has been that such models help to preserve the ‘full’ 
autonomy of the adult for a longer period than would otherwise be possible, an examination 
of the current legal models, and in particular the co-decision-making models, show that this 
is not what is being implemented.   
                                                                                                                             
Report No 4, BCLI Report No 46, Canadian Centre for Elder Law Studies and British Columbia Law 
Institute, October 2006) 36). 
120 See, eg, Gordon, above n 47, 74: ‘[T]here is dignity in the risk that attends poor judgment.  Further, 
no one learns without experiences, both positive and negative’. 
121 The Adult Guardianship and Co-decision-making Act, S 2000, c A-5.3, s 3(a).  The first guardianship 
principle states: ‘adults are entitled to have their best interests given paramount consideration’.  See 
also Adult Guardianship and Trusteeship Act, A 2008, c A-4.2, s 18(1). 
122 Creyke, above n 21, 41. But see, eg, in Alberta when examining the adult’s ‘best interests’, 
consideration must be given to any wishes known to have been expressed by the adult when the 
adult had capacity and values and beliefs known to have been held by the adult: Adult Guardianship 
and Trusteeship Act, A 2008, c A-4.2, s 2(d). 
123 Cf Surtees, above n 15, 85.  
124 Gordon, above n 47, 74 suggests that neglect could occur in a health care situation where: 
[A] supported individual refuses to give consent to a treatment that will prevent a worsening 
of his or her medical condition because the individual does not fully understand and 
appreciate the consequences of refusal. 
125 Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 5, ch 6. 
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The limitations placed on adults under co-decision-making models (and to a far lesser extent 
under supported decision-making models) clearly are not applicable to adults exercising ‘full’ 
autonomy.  Arguably, as a consequence, one of two things must occur in order for there to 
be a clear understanding of what the models are trying to achieve.  The first is that those 
implementing the models must avoid conceptual dishonesty and admit that what is achieved 
by these models is not ‘full’ autonomy granted to adults under such models but a form of 
‘restricted’ autonomy where most, but not all, the decisions made under such a scheme will 
be legally recognised.  The reason for the restriction – i.e. the protection of adults – also 
needs to be explicitly articulated.   
In the alternative, in order to live up to the promise of maintaining ‘full’ decision-making 
autonomy for those within such models, the limitations on ‘unreasonable’ decisions and 
considerations of the adult’s ‘best interests’ must be removed.  Implementing models like 
those in Canada without taking either of these steps would arguably be conceptually 
disingenuous and confusing. 
3.2 Legal issues 
3.2.1 What happens to informal assistance? 
It has been questioned whether in implementing formal assisted decision-making 
mechanisms existing informal supports will be detrimentally affected.126  Some adults 
eligible to use supported or co-decision-making mechanisms may find such measures 
unnecessary as informal decision-making is sufficient.  Any assisted decision-making regime 
must allow informal decision-making to be concurrently maintained.127  As supported 
decision-making agreements are similar to personal advance planning document, like 
enduring powers of attorney, they should in no way be mandated.  In this regard, the British 
Columbian approach may be useful in ensuring that third parties do not require such 
appointments to be made.  That provision states, ‘[a]n adult must not be required to have 
[an agreement] as a condition of receiving any good or service’.128  
3.2.2 Should arrangements encompass personal, health care and financial matters?  
A question arises as to the appropriate scope for supported and co-decision-making 
arrangements.  Should they be available for all types of decisions – personal, financial, 
health care – or should some kind of limitation be imposed?  As a matter of maximising the 
autonomy to the adult, it would seem natural to allow such schemes to extend to all types of 
decisions.  It would be expected that support might be needed in all spheres of life and to 
limit its availability to only some areas would limit the utility of such arrangements.129  
Legally, however, implementing these arrangements may raise issues of liability and 
potential abuse (discussed further below) by supporters and co-decision-makers, particularly 
in relation to financial decisions.130  For example, the legislation in Alberta excludes financial 
                                            
126 Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship Consultation Paper No 10 (2011) [7.65]. 
127 See also Carter, above n 70, 26; Queensland Law Reform Commission, above n 6, 201; Gordon, 
above n 47, 73, Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 5, [8.73]. 
128 Representation Agreement Act, BC 1996, c 405, s 3.1. 
129 Kerzner, above n 51, 35 notes that this exclusion ‘limits the usefulness’ of the regime. Note, this is 
the view of the Victorian Law Reform Commission: Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 5, 
[8.92]-[8.96], [8.109]-[8.109]. 
130 Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 126, [7.110]–[7.112]. 
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decisions from its supported and co-decision-making mechanisms.131  However, in Australia, 
pilot studies regarding assisted decision-making in relation to financial matters are 
underway.132  Such studies may shed light on whether such restrictions are really needed.  
3.2.3 Liability under supported and co-decision-making arrangements 
To avoid confusion, the legal liability of supporters and co-decision-makers must be dealt 
with in legislation.  If supported and co-decision-making arrangements are simply viewed as 
an extension to the situation where a competent person exercises their right to make 
decisions, then the adult should have sole responsibility for the consequences of that action.  
An argument could certainly be mounted that this is how supported decision-making models 
should operate; it has been suggested that supporters should not be liable unless they have 
failed to provide ‘adequate support’ or have a conflict of interest in a decision.133  However, 
in co-decision-making arrangements some would argue that the decision-making is shared.  
As such, there is a stronger argument – both practically and ethically - for the consequences 
and liability of the action to also be shared.134   
Of course, where a supporter or co-decision-maker disagrees with an adult’s decision, for 
them to then be held liable for a decision they did not agree with and advised the adult 
against, would seem unfair.  Some legislation has recognised this problem and offers a 
solution.  For example in Yukon, the legislation removes doubt by explicitly stating that a 
supporter is not liable for a decision made by an adult if the supporter did not agree with the 
decision and advised the adult against it.135  In Victoria, the current recommendations 
provide that where disagreement exists, recourse can be made to the Tribunal; no decision 
can be made without the agreement of both parties as the recommendations expressly state 
that the adult is deemed incapable of making certain decisions without the support of the 
co-decision-maker.136 
Outside of a disagreement however, the approach of the legislative models has been to 
exclude supporters and co-decision-makers from liability incurred when acting in good faith 
(see 2.2.2-2.2.3 above).  Deliberate abuse in such a position would be subject to penalties 
equivalent to that of guardians and administrators.137 
A further question arises as to the nature of the relationship between the adult and the 
supporter or co-decision-maker.  While the relationship between an appointed substitute 
decision-maker (i.e. attorneys, guardians or administrators) and adults with impaired 
capacity can be characterised as a fiduciary one (although the scope and content of that 
fiduciary relationship remain unclear),138 it is not clear whether this would also apply to 
supporters and co-decision-makers.139   
                                            
131 Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 5, [8.52], [9.71]–[9.77]. 
132 New South Wales Attorney General and Justice, above n 6, 37. 
133 See Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 5, [8.128]; Bach, above n 6, 11. 
134 Carter, above n 70, 26. 
135 Decision-making, Support and Protection to Adults Act, Y 2003, c 21, s 13(2). 
136 Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 5, [9.86] 165. 
137 Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 5, [9.109]–[9.110]. 
138 Frolik, above n 48; Karen E Boxx, 'The Durable Power of Attorney's Place in the Family of Fiduciary 
Relationships' (2001) 36 Georgia Law Review 1. 
139 Frolik, above n 48; Karen E Boxx, 'The Durable Power of Attorney's Place in the Family of Fiduciary 
Relationships' (2001) 36 Georgia Law Review 1. This has also been recognised by Australia’s 
guardianship tribunals, see Queensland Law Reform Commission, above n 57, vol 3, 113 n 425. 
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Substitute decision-makers appointed by courts have obligations towards the adult they 
represent as well as obligations to the court that appointed them.140  It may be questioned 
whether similar obligations exist, particularly in relation to court appointed supporters or co-
decision-makers.  The argument against such a fiduciary relationship arising in relation to 
supporters is that the adult essentially retains full decision-making responsibility.  However, 
the same cannot be said of co-decision-makers.   
The Victorian Law Reform Commission has sought to clarify this issue and has recommended 
that a provision be included which states that a supporter and co-decision-maker’s role is 
fiduciary in nature.  While a general exclusion of liability provision similar to that in Alberta 
has been suggested in the Commission’s model,141 the recognition of a fiduciary relationship 
arguably introduces new uncertainties into the role.  For example, traditional fiduciary 
relationships involve duties of loyalty and to avoid conflict of interests.  Some aspects of 
these duties may sit uncomfortably with the supporter and co-decision-maker’s role 
particularly where decisions made by the adult may be considered harmful to the adult or 
have (sometimes inadvertent) beneficial consequences for those appointed.  In any new 
legislation, provisions dealing with liability of supporters and co-decision-makers ought to 
take these matters into account.  
3.2.4 What legal safeguards are needed? 
Article 12.4 of the CRPD mandates that certain safeguards should exist to prevent abuse 
including ensuring that an adult’s exercise of capacity is ‘free of conflict of interest and 
undue influence’.142  While some suggest that an ‘adult who has a trusted and skilled friend 
to assist with making important decisions is often well protected from exploitation’,143 
history suggests that this will not always be the case.  From experience with attorneys, 
guardians and administrators we unfortunately know, and the CRPD is right to anticipate, 
that there may be those that abuse positions of power.144  It would be naïve not to expect 
similar abuses in supported and co-decision-making models.  Governments wishing to 
comply with the CRPD by implementing supported or co-decision-making models must 
therefore consider how potential abuses can be curbed. Admittedly, the consideration of 
abuse in this context is very similar to the issues that arise in the context of enduring powers 
of attorneys.  
Obviously with court appointed co-decision-makers, some initial means of ensuring an 
appropriate person is appointed can be exercised (see 2.2.3 above) and this extends to court 
monitoring, review and removal of such persons.145  However, it has been noted that 
                                            
140 Frolik, above n 48, 56–7 . 
141 Victorian law Reform Commission, above n 5, recommendation 90, 170.  
142 Article 12 goes on to state that measures relating to the adult must be ‘proportional and tailored 
to the person’s circumstances, apply for the shortest time possible and are subject to regular review 
by a competent, independent and impartial authority or judicial body’.  These safeguards are beyond 
the scope of this article.  
143 Surtees, above n 15, 84. 
144 See, eg, Cheryl Tilse and Jill Wilson, ‘The mismanagement of the assets of older people: the 
concerns and actions of aged care practitioners in Queensland’ (2003) 22 Australasian Journal on 
Ageing 9, 11; United States Government Accountability Office, ‘Guardianships: Cases of Financial 
Exploitation, Neglect, and Abuse of Seniors’ (Report to the Chairman, Special Committee on Aging, US 
Senate GAO-10-1046, United States Government Accountability Office, September 2010).  
145 See, eg, in Saskatchewan, property co-decision-makers have obligations to keep records and 
provide accounting records to the court: The Adult Guardianship and Co-decision-making Act, S 2000, 
c A-5.3, ss 54–5.  Also, in Alberta the court is able to remove persons who have acted improperly or 
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privately executed agreements may result in undetected abuse: ‘[t]he more private and 
informal the arrangement the more likely it is that it will go undetected and unresolved if it 
does occur.’146   
While some legislation like that in Yukon explicitly state that supporters ‘shall not exert 
undue influence upon’ or ‘make decisions on behalf of’ the adult, these provisions lack 
teeth.147  Placing strict reporting and monitoring requirements on these private 
arrangements may assist,148 but could also be seen as ‘imping[ing] on the freedom of action’ 
of the adult concerned.  It may also prevent family or friends from taking on a role that not 
only requires administering and a significant time commitment, but also the potential to be 
brought before a court for failing one’s duties under the act.  (This goes back to the issue 
raised at 1.4.1 regarding the burden of responsibility falling to individuals, families and 
communities, rather than the State.) 
In addition, having provisions like that in Alberta, where third parties dealing with adults 
with supporters may refuse to recognise a decision made if there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that the supporter exercised undue influence or that there may be fraud or 
misrepresentation on the part of the supporter may be helpful.149  However, this may place 
an (unrealistic?) onus on third parties to be wary of such exploitation.150  
Supported and co-decision-making arrangements become difficult where an adult’s 
decision-making ability begins to diminish or fluctuates downward.151  While it would appear 
logical that such arrangements would be unable to continue where an adult’s decision-
making capacity drops below a certain level the mechanism for detecting this and ending the 
arrangement is not clear in some legislation.  In the current models, a level of responsibility 
is placed on those appointed, and on third parties to monitor this.  
While most co-decision-making arrangements are, or can be made subject to periodic review 
by courts in Canada, outside of this the onus is presumably on co-decision-makers and third 
parties to notify the court of concerns or changes in capacity that effect the 
arrangements.152  In Alberta this obligation on co-decision-makers is express, placing an onus 
on them to approach the court if a change in capacity means that a variation or termination 
                                                                                                                             
not in accordance with the legislation under a review of a co-decision-making order: Adult 
Guardianship and Trusteeship Act, A 2008, c A-4.2, s 21(b). 
146 Carter, above n 70, 27.  
147 Decision-making, Support and Protection to Adults Act, Y 2003, c 21, s 5(2).  
148 Such record keeping requirements already exist for supporters: Adult Guardianship and 
Trusteeship (Ministerial) Regulation, Alta Reg 224/2009, s 4. 
149 Adult Guardianship and Trusteeship Act, A 2008, c A-4.2, s 6(2). The Yukon legislation is phrased 
slightly differently: ‘A decision made or communicated with the assistance of an associate decision-
maker shall be recognized for the purposes of any provision of law as the decision of the adult, 
subject to the laws regarding fraud, misrepresentation, and undue influence: Decision-making, 
Support and Protection to Adults Act, Y 2003, c 21, s 11. 
150 See also Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 5, [9.84]. 
151 Cf The Alberta Public Advocate suggests this is not a problem: Victorian Law Reform Commission, 
above n 5, [9.12]. 
152 However, in Saskatchewan reviews will only be ordered by the court if it is in the best interests of 
the adult, so there may be circumstances where no review is ordered: The Adult Guardianship and Co-
decision-making Act, S 2000, c A-5.3, ss 22(1)(b), 47(1)(b). And, for example, in Alberta in 2011, 2 
complaints were received about the actions of co-decision-makers, but none were removed as a 
result of the complaint: Email from Patrick McManus to Shih-Ning Then, 15 May 2012. 
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of the order may be in the adult’s best interests.153  Alternatively more general provisions 
can be relied upon that allow any interested person to apply for a review of co-decision-
making arrangements.154  But, how does the third party, supporter or co-decision-maker 
know how to assess when a sufficient level of capacity is lost in the adult to make the 
arrangement no longer legal?  Legislation may also provide for termination of arrangements 
when more restrictive orders are made (i.e. a co-decision-making order or guardianship 
order) or where an advance directive comes into effect.155   
Safeguards to overcome some of these issues have been suggested. For example, some 
advocate:156 
• That a statutory official’s office, (e.g. each jurisdiction’s ‘Public Advocate), 
should have legislative power to investigate allegations that a supporter or co-
decision-maker has acted improperly and have responsibility for resolving 
conflicts within such an arrangement. 
• A court should have powers in relation to these arrangements similar to the 
powers it can exercise in relation to enduring powers of attorney – i.e. the 
power to revoke an agreement. 
• Police checks on court appointed persons. 
• Prohibitions on acting in conflict transactions.  
• Lodgement of records for financial transactions.  
It is noted that monitoring roles by government departments and courts require significant 
resources and realistically every decision cannot be reviewed by public bodies.  As an 
alternative, ensuring the involvement of more than one person in arrangement may also act 
as a safeguard.  Some suggest appointing at least two persons in such positions157 or, under 
the hybrid British Columbian model, adults can appoint ‘monitors’ as well as those to assist 
them make decisions.  The monitors are given power under the legislation to oversee how 
decisions are made and to ‘monitor’ the actions of the appointed person.158  Such a model 
could be adapted to apply to both supported and co-decision-making models and perhaps 
offers a good middle ground in providing safeguards against abuse of the intentional and 
non-intentional kind.  
3.2.5 Consistency with other laws 
A final legal issue relates to how well supported or co-decision-making models fit with 
existing laws.  For example, will any adjustment need to be made to laws regarding 
execution of wills or advance health directives if there is a co-decision-maker involved? 
Should there be limitations imposed on supporters or co-decision-makers being appointed 
as attorneys?  New schemes should anticipate and expressly provide for how they will 
operate with existing laws.   
                                            
153 Adult Guardianship and Trusteeship Act, A 2008, c A-4.2, s 21(2)(b). 
154 The Adult Guardianship and Co-decision-making Act, S 2000, c A-5.3, s 66; Adult Guardianship and 
Trusteeship Act, A 2008, c A-4.2, s 21(1).  
155 Adult Guardianship and Trusteeship Act, A 2008, c A-4.2, s 8.  
156 Carter, above n 70, 25; Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 126, [7.114]; Victorian Law 
Reform Commission, above n 5, [8.123]-[8.124], [9.81],[9.100]–[9.103]. 
157 Cf Ibid [9.67].  
158 See discussion at 2.2.3 above. 
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3.3 Practical challenges 
3.3.1 Increased complexity and limited utility? 
Undoubtedly, adding yet another advance planning tool to the swathe of documents 
(enduring powers of attorney, advance directives, appointment of health care decision-
makers etc.) and layers of legislation and regulation that exist in most guardianship regimes 
adds an additional layer of complexity to what is already a very complex system.159  This may 
present particular problems for the target cohort – adults with some decision-making 
impairment.160   
Any legal initiatives to introduce supported and co-decision-making mechanisms therefore 
need to be buttressed by significant education to the general public but more importantly to 
those likely to be dealing with supporters or co-decision-makers – e.g., government 
departments, financial institutions, private accommodation/aged care providers, etc.161  
Despite the existence of enduring powers of attorneys for some time now, there is evidence 
that segments of the community dealing with adults with impaired capacity still 
misunderstand the nature and requirements of such documents;162 similar problems might 
be expected with new supported or co-decision-making arrangements.  The cost of 
continuously running education sessions to these third parties must also be considered.163  
If these legal initiatives are introduced without sufficient resources, people will remain 
unaware of changes and inertia against changing existing culture will not dissipate, and 
anticipated benefits of reform will not be realised.164  Critical to the success of these legal 
reforms is investing sufficient resources and engaging the support of relevant sections of the 
community.165 
Even with sufficient resources and cultural change, whether these types of arrangements 
would be utilised to a significant extent is a difficult question to answer.  For some adults, 
assisted decision-making arrangements may simply not be suitable; Alberta’s approach has 
been where adults are likely to suffer periods where they cannot communicate or make 
decisions (e.g. advanced multiple sclerosis, dementia), then guardianship will be preferred.  
Similarly, those with bi-polar conditions may not be able to utilise co-decision-making as an 
                                            
159 Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 126, [7.80]; Kerzner, above n 51, 35. 
160 Kerzner makes this point in the Alberta context referring to problems it may create for those with 
intellectual disabilities: Kerzner, above n 51, 35.  See also community responses in Victorian Law 
Reform Commission, above n 5, [8.49]. 
161 Terry Carney, Challenges to the Australian Guardianship and Administration Model? (2003) 2 Elder 
Law Review 11, 8 (noting the significance of private accommodation/aged care services in Australia). 
See also Tilse et al, above n 54, 103-4 noting the barriers to supported decision-making in residential 
aged care facilities.  
162 Tilse et al, above n 54, 104.  
163 Email from Kelly Cooper to Shih-Ning Then, 12 April 2012. See also comments by Michelle 
Browning, ‘Report by Michelle Browning 2010 Churchill Fellow: To Investigate New Models of 
Guardianship and the Emerging Practice of Supported Decision-making’ (Winston Churchill memorial 
Trust of Australia, 2011), 24, that engaging the health and legal communities has proved challenging 
in Alberta and the UK.  The Victorian Law Reform Commission has also acknowledged these 
challenges: Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 5, [9.76]–[9.77]. 
164 See Salzman, above n 3, 231; Carney, above n 161, 9; Tilse et al, above n 54, 104; Frolick, above n 
55 at 352–3.  
165 Tilse et al, above n 54, 106; Devi, Bickenbach and Stucki, above n 3, 263.  
 30 
adult’s delusions of grandeur or persecution during a manic phase will interfere with the co-
decision-making relationship when it is most crucial.166  
In those jurisdictions with existing supported decision-making agreements, the actual 
number of agreements in existence is unknown.167  Evidence as to co-decision-making orders 
is also limited.  In 2010, Surtees reported that less than 7% of applications to the court were 
for co-decision-making orders with a total of 30 over a span of 9 years.168  In Alberta, a total 
of 37 co-decision-making applications have been granted by the court since October 2009, 
with some guardianship orders being ‘re-issued’ as co-decision-making orders each year.169 
3.3.2 Third party enforcement 
A further practical issue is how to ensure that third parties respect assisted decision-making.  
This flows from the need to educate third parties likely to come across such arrangements.  
Without such education third parties will be less likely to accept decisions made via an 
assisted decision-making paradigm.  Paradoxically, Yukon has reported that attempts to 
make supported decision-making forms accessible and understandable to adults who may 
wish to use them, has raised fears that third parties may refuse to recognise them as they do 
not look ‘official enough’.170 
Establishing registers of supported or co-decision-making arrangements to be held by a 
government office as proposed by the Victorian Law Reform Commission may help with such 
reluctance but has significant resource implications.171 
3.3.3 The complexity of the supporter and co-decision-maker role 
The role of legally recognised supporters, and in particular co-decision-makers, is novel.  As 
such, those taking on the role will require education and guidance if they are to successfully 
act in such positions.  This may not be easy; the concept of co-decision-making in particular 
is conceptually, legally and practically difficult to grapple with.  This statement by the 
Victorian Public Advocate, while applicable to both roles, seems particularly apposite to co-
decision-makers who have a greater role and influence in an adult’s decision-making:172 
It is important to not underestimate the difficulty of determining whether a person 
is capable of making a particular decision or the difficulty of assisting a person with a 
disability to make and communicate their decisions without influencing or 
interfering with the final decision and becoming a de factor decision-maker. 
While it has been noted that no decision-making process is free from influence,173 this does 
not diminish the danger of coercion or slipping unintentionally into de facto substituted 
                                            
166 Email from Patrick McManus to Shih-Ning Then, 15 May 2012.   
167 This is because these agreements are usually personal (not court appointed) and no current 
requirement to register agreements exists.  
168 Surtees, above n 15, 92.  
169 Email from Patrick McManus to Shih-Ning Then, 15 May 2012.  It was also noted that 9 
applications were currently in process.  
170 Email from Kelly Cooper to Shih-Ning Then, 12 April 2012.  
171 Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 5, [9.101]–[9.103]. See also Carter, above n 70, 25. 
172 Carter, above n 70, 26.  Gordon, above n 47, 74 also notes that it is an ‘immensely difficult task 
given the laudable human propensity to protect those perceived to be vulnerable from the exercise of 
their own poor judgment.’ See also Burningham, above n 8, 12. 
173 See Devi, Bickenbach and Stucki, above n 3, 255; Salzman, above n 3, 233 n 237. 
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decision-making without the proper authority to do so.  This seems most likely where an 
appointed person lacks understanding of their role or when an adult’s decision-making 
ability begins to deteriorate.  
In addition, the conceptual novelty of a legally recognised ‘shared’ decision-making process, 
arguably makes explanation of a co-decision-maker’s job even harder.  It is difficult to 
produce a comparable decision-making paradigm that provides an appropriate analogy; 
other shared or joint decisions – i.e. as joint trustees or joint bank account holders – will 
involve two equal adults with full decision-making abilities.  In supported and, to a much 
greater extent, co-decision-making models, it is a lopsided relationship.   
It is also known that different adults can have very different decision-making styles in 
making choices (known as ‘metapreferences’) which includes variances in the amount of 
information collected prior to decision-making, time taken to make a decision and use of 
intuition.174  As such supporters and co-decision-makers need to be mindful not to replace 
the adult’s decision-making method with their own preferred decision-making style.175  
Education and training of those proposing to act as supporters and co-decision-makers 
seems crucial to these models working as intended.  In Yukon and Alberta, limited resources 
have been devoted to providing information and, where possible, adults and their 
supporters or co-decision-makers are contacted.176 
Who will explain their role and educate them as to what is too much or little in this shared 
decision-making paradigm?  How will they know when the adult’s capacity has diminished to 
the point where the co-decision-making arrangement no longer truly represents shared 
decision-making? These are difficult and decision-specific questions that place significant 
responsibility on co-decision-makers.  As such, jurisdictions which plan to introduce such 
positions arguably have a responsibility to appropriately resource, educate and advise those 
who take on such roles.177 
3.3.4 What happens when no one is available? 
Another pressing question is what happens to people who have no support network and 
have no one suitable to act as supporters or co-decision-makers?  This is particularly 
relevant in light of the fact that government entities like the Public Trustee or Public 
Advocate are often excluded from acting as supporters and co-decision-makers.178  It seems 
                                            
174 See also Jack Dowie, ‘The Role of Patients’ Meta-preferences in the Design and Evaluation of 
Decision Support Systems’ (2002) 5 Health Expectations 16 cited in Office of the Public Advocate 
South Australia, ‘Developing a Model of Practice of Supported Decision-making’ (Office of the Public 
Advocate South Australia in collaboration with the Julia Farr MS McLeod Benevolent Fund, June 2011) 
14. 
175 Office of the Public Advocate South Australia, above n 52. 
176 Email from Kelly Cooper to Shih-Ning Then, 12 April 2012; Email from Patrick McManus to Shih-
Ning Then, 15 May 2012.   
177 See also Devi, Bickenbach and Stucki, above n 3, 263 who provides a number of examples where it 
is not clear how supported decision-making models will operate.  
178 See, eg, Adult Guardianship and Trusteeship Act, A 2008, c A-4.2, ss 5, 15; Representation 
Agreement Act, BC 1996, c 405, s 5(1)(b).  See also Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 5, 
[9.65]-[9.67].  This is consistent with the suggestion by Glass that government and non-government 
bodies should not be providing these roles where family and friends are available and appropriate: 
Glass, above n 43, 32.  Other jurisdictions may also exclude other categories of persons, see, eg, 
Decision-making, Support and Protection to Adults Act, Y 2003, c 21,s 7; Representation Agreement 
Act, BC 1996, c 405, s 5(1).   
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the problem is quite common for a proportion of adults who might otherwise be eligible to 
participate in these legislative schemes.179  In South Australia, where a small scale non-
statutory scheme of supported decision-making arrangements is being undertaken, 
strategies being considered to deal with this problem include programs that develop social 
networks for people and the use of ‘volunteer’ supporters.180  If no legislative solution is 
provided (and adequately funded) for those without appropriate existing social supports, 
this will essentially deny these legal options to a significant number of individuals who could 
benefit.181   
Kerzner suggests that government should have a role to play;182 however, if such a 
responsibility exists how should this be actioned?  Potential models include governments 
directly providing such supports (i.e. utilising government funded social workers, health care 
workers, etc) or funding non-governmental organisations to provide such services.183 
4.  ASSISTED DECISION-MAKING – CONCLUSION 
There is little doubt that the goals of assisted decision-making are laudable and consistent 
with the current trend in guardianship legislation to maximise the autonomy of adults with 
diminishing capacity.  However, this paper has demonstrated that, depending on how 
assisted decision-making is implemented in legislation, giving legal recognition to these 
models can lead to a number of conceptual, legal and, in all probability, practical problems.   
To date, discussion of the different assisted decision-making models and the concepts 
underpinning them has been relatively scarce, with literature often taking a broad brush 
approach in discussing potential problems.  This paper has situated the new impetus for 
assisted decision-making within the social and legal historical context of guardianship laws 
to inform a thorough discussion of its nature and potential.  Informed by this exegesis and 
by analysing international developments this paper has also identified and analysed some 
key legal, conceptual and practical issues which jurisdictions wishing to implement assisted 
decision-making models ought to consider in the context of their own guardianship regimes.   
Given the unanswered questions about how existing systems operate in practice, empirical 
research in this area is required to assess how well assisted decision-making models work 
and whether the aims of legislation are being achieved. 
 
                                            
179 See, eg, Office of the Public Advocate South Australia, above n 52; Email from Kelly Cooper to Shih-
Ning Then, 12 April 2012. 
180 Office of the Public Advocate South Australia, above n 52. 
181 Note that this has been an issue in relation in the context of appointing substitute decision-
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